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Abstract
A method for automated analysis of fault-tolerance of distributed systems is presented. It
is based on a stream model of computation augmented with approximation constructs, and
this facilitates efficient analysis. Analyses of a protocol for fault-tolerant moving agents and a
reliable broadcast protocol illustrate the method.
1 Introduction
As computers become integrated into mission-critical systems, there is a growing need for techniques
to establish that software systems satisfy their requirements. Fault-tolerance is likely to be one of
these requirements. The following methodology can be used to establish fault-tolerance of a system:
0. Partition the system into components.
1. Identify possible failures of each component.
2. Posit correctness requirements on system behavior for each combination of possible failures.
3. Check whether the system satisfies these requirements.
This paper describes a method and automated tool for step 3.
A failure identified in step 1 is defined to be one way that a component’s actual behavior might
diverge from its normal (specified) behavior. For example, a Byzantine failure causes a processor
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to execute an arbitrary sequence of instructions, unrelated to the program it would have executed
in the absence of the failure [LSP82]. A failure scenario for a system is an assignment of failures
to a subset of the system’s components.
In step 2 above, requirements on system behavior in various failure scenarios are posited. For
example, an aircraft control system might be required to provide normal service despite the Byzan-
tine failure of any single component. In our terminology, this requirement is: “for every failure
scenario in which at most one component is faulty, signals sent by the aircraft control system to
actuators should be the same as what would be sent if no failures had occurred.”
Step 3 above is to check whether a system in the presence of failures satisfies some requirements.
Experience has shown that informal arguments here tend to be error-prone and thus do not sup-
ply the desired level of assurance for mission-critical systems [ORSvH95]. For example, although
replication and voting might seem easy to justify informally, the extensive literature on Byzantine
agreement protocols and errors like the one described in [LR93] suggest that efficient coordination
of non-faulty replicas in the presence of arbitrary behavior by faulty replicas is quite subtle.
The limitations of informal arguments has motivated the development of rigorous methods.
One class of methods is based on formal logics. However, most people who design and validate
fault-tolerant systems are not experts in mathematical logic or formal verification, so methods
that require construction of proofs (even with support from a theorem-proving system) have a
limited audience. Proof techniques designed specifically for verification of fault-tolerance (e.g.,
[SS83, CdR93, Web93, PJ94, Sch94]) facilitate the construction of these proofs but still require
logical expertise of the user.
Another class of methods is based on exhaustive exploration of finite state spaces [Hol91, CGL94,
Kur94, CS96]. These methods have enjoyed considerable success for verification of hardware and
communication protocols. But for many fault-tolerant asynchronous distributed software systems,
the time and memory required for state-space exploration are prohibitively large.
The method for analysis of fault-tolerance properties for distributed systems described in this
paper uses a novel combination of stream-processing (or data-flow) models of networks of processes
[Kah74, Bro87, Bro90] and abstract interpretation of programs [CC77, JN94]. An important feature
of our method is its emphasis on communication (rather than state), motivated by the thesis that
distributed systems often have natural descriptions in terms of communication. This emphasis
shapes both the representation of system behavior and the method used to compute it. In our
framework, system behavior is represented by message flow graphs (MFGs), which characterize the
possible communication behaviors of the system. Each node of a MFG corresponds to a system
component, and each edge is labeled with a description of the sequence of messages possibly sent
from its source to its target. For simplicity, this paper considers systems in which components
interact only by messages transmitted along unbounded FIFO channels; non-FIFO channels are
easily accommodated, though.
Exact computation of all possible sequences of messages that might be sent during system
execution is generally infeasible. To help make automated analysis feasible, our framework supports
flexible and powerful abstractions (approximations). Traditionally, stream-processing models have
been used as mathematical semantics and contained no abstractions. The abstractions in our
method apply to values (the data transmitted in messages), multiplicities (the number of times each
value is sent), and message orderings (the order in which values are sent). Values and multiplicities
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are approximated using abstract interpretation and symbolic computation. Message orderings are
abstracted by allowing partial orders in place of total orders. Taken all together, the abstractions in
our method enable compact representations of the highly non-deterministic behavior characteristic
of failures and support abstraction from irrelevant aspects of a system’s failure-free behavior.
We use only conservative abstractions, so the analysis never falsely implies that a system satis-
fies its fault-tolerance requirement. However, conservative abstractions do introduce the possibility
of false negatives: an analysis might not establish that a system satisfies its fault-tolerance require-
ment, even though the system does.
Our analysis method is to compute, for each failure scenario of interest, an MFG representing
the system’s communication behaviors in that failure scenario. Each MFG is then checked to
see whether the fault-tolerance requirement for that failure scenario is satisfied. A more common
method (e.g., [SS83, LJ92, CdR93, Web93, PJ94, LM94]) is to model failures as events that occur
non-deterministically during a computation; system behavior in all failure scenarios is analyzed
together. We separate the analyses for different failure scenarios for two reasons: (i) this separation
is convenient for failure scenarios with different requirements, and (ii) it helps keep the MFGs small
and simple.
Our method for computing an MFG for a failure scenario is based on a stream-processing model
of distributed systems. Each system component is represented by one or more input-output functions
that describe its input/output behavior. An input-output function that represents a component
takes as arguments sequences of messages received from different sources and returns the sequences
of messages sent to different destinations by that component. Thus, an input-output function
encapsulates (an abstraction of) the implementation of a component. One verifies independently
for each component that the proposed input-output function faithfully (but perhaps approximately)
represents the component’s behavior. Given input-output functions representing components, the
streams of messages sent on each channel during execution can be expressed and computed as a
fixed-point.
Stream-processing models emphasize communication behavior, rather than the local state, of
each component. Stream-processing models also admit compact representations for sequences of
messages, and those representations can be used directly as inputs to the input-output function
representing a component.
MFGs could be computed from conventional state-based models of components by constructing
the graph of reachable states and then extracting an MFG, but this would typically be less efficient
than what we do. Our analysis does not construct global states and therefore seems to circumvent
the state-space explosion problem. At least, our experience has been that MFGs describing a
system’s behavior are often smaller than the full state graph for the system. Furthermore, MFGs
are often smaller than reduced state graphs computed using partial-order methods [Pel98]. This is
illustrated in Section 3.3.
One could regard our framework as having a powerful built-in partial-order method, because it
does not consider interleavings of messages sent (or received) by a component on different channels.
Such inter-channel orderings cannot be represented directly in MFGs, though in some cases such
orderings can be inferred from properties of the input-output functions. Consequently, the behav-
ior of systems that depend on such orderings cannot, in general, be analyzed exactly using our
framework. It might be possible to augment MFGs to represent such orderings; this is discussed in
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Section 5.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method. Section 3
illustrates the method with two examples. Section 4 describes a prototype implementation of the
method. Section 5 discusses related and future work.
2 Communication-Based Analysis Framework
We first describe how data values are abstracted in our framework and then how sets and sequences
of messages are abstracted. This leads directly to the definitions of input-output function and MFG
that are the foundation of our analysis method.
2.1 Values
As in abstract interpretation, we introduce a set AVal of abstract values. Each abstract value
represents a set of concrete values. For example, we use abstract value N to represent the set of
64-bit numbers, and in the analysis of the moving-agent protocol in Section 3.1, abstract value
Arb(keys ,ms) represents concrete values that can be generated using encryption keys in the set
keys and texts in the set ms .
For analysis, abstract values alone capture too little information about relationships between
concrete values. The output of a majority voter, for example, depends on equality relationships
among its inputs. If two voter inputs both have abstract value N, then there would be no way to
tell whether they are equal. So, we introduce a set SVal of symbolic values, which are expressions
composed of constants, variables, and a wildcard symbol. All occurrences of a constant or variable
in a single MFG represent the same (concrete) value. The wildcard symbol “ ” is used when a
value is not known to have any interesting relationships to other values. Different occurrences of
the wildcard in a MFG do not necessarily represent the same value. For example, if two inputs of
a 3-way voter are denoted by the same (non-wildcard) symbolic value, then that symbolic value
represents the majority value and therefore represents the voter’s output.
A constant represents the same value in every execution of a system; most constants are typeset
in a sans-serif font. For example, a constant maj might represent a majority function. A variable
represents values that may be different in different executions of a system. Variables are useful
for modeling outputs that are not completely determined by a component’s inputs. Such outputs
commonly arise with components that interact with an environment that is not being modeled
explicitly. They also arise when a component’s behavior is approximated. Each variable is local to
(i.e., is associated with) one component and corresponds to a concrete value in that component’s
outputs [Sto97]. Associating each variable with one component makes it possible to check inde-
pendently that each input-output function faithfully represents the behavior of the corresponding
component.
A symbolic value and an abstract value together are often sufficient to characterize possible
data values in a message. Analysis of a non-deterministic system might yield multiple such pairs,
each representing some of the possible data values in a message. So, we use a set of such pairs to
represent values, and define Val
∆
= Set(SVal ×AVal) \ {∅}, where Set(S) is the powerset of a set S.
For example, {〈X1,Msg〉, 〈X2,Msg〉} denotes a value in Msg that is represented by symbolic value
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X1 or X2. We usually write a pair 〈s, a〉 ∈ SVal × AVal as s :a, and we usually omit curly braces
around singleton sets. For example, {〈F(X), D〉} may be written as {F(X) : D} or F(X) : D. A
wildcard is similar in meaning to omission of a symbolic value, so we usually elide wildcards. For
example, {〈 ,N〉} ∈ Val would be written as N.
2.2 Multiplicities
Uncertainty in the number of messages sent during a computation may stem from intrinsic non-
determinism of the original system, non-determinism introduced in a model when some aspects of
the system or its environment are not modeled explicitly, non-determinism from failures, or from
uncertainty caused by other abstractions (of data, multiplicity, or message ordering). For example,
a component subject to Byzantine failures might emit outputs with an arbitrary multiplicity. To
compactly represent these possibilities, we allow abstractions of the multiplicity (i.e., the number
of occurrences) of each message.
We think of multiplicities as natural numbers and therefore represent them in the same way
as data values. Thus, we define Mul
∆
= Set(SVal × AMul) \ {∅}, where the set AMul of abstract
multiplicities is a subset of AVal and contains abstract values that represent subsets of the natural
numbers, excluding ∅ and {0} (these two subsets would correspond to something that did not
happen.) We assume AVal contains the following: 1, denoting {1}; ?, denoting {0, 1}; and ∗,
denoting the set of natural numbers. The notational conventions for Val also apply to Mul . For
example, {〈 , ?〉} ∈ Mul may be written as ?.
2.3 Sets and Posets of Messages
ms-atoms (mnemonic for “message-set atoms”) are abstractions of sets of messages. Each ms-atom
uses an element of Val to characterize the data in the messages and an element of Mul to characterize
the number of messages in the set. Thus, the signature of ms-atoms is MSA
∆
= Val × Mul . For
example, an ms-atom 〈X : Msg, ∗〉 with value X : Msg and multiplicity ∗ represents a set S of
messages such that: (1) the data in each message is an element of (the set represented by) Msg ,
and the data is represented by variable X (hence all the messages in S contain the same data),
and (2) the number of messages in S is arbitrary (but finite). As another example, an ms-atom
〈 :Msg , ∗〉 represents an arbitrary-sized set of messages, with each message containing a (possibly
different) element of Msg . Similarly, 〈X :Msg , Y :?〉 represents Y occurrences of a value X in Msg ,
where the value of Y is zero or one. To promote the resemblance between ms-atoms and regular
expressions, we write an ms-atom 〈val ,mul〉 as valmul , and if the multiplicity mul is 1, we usually
elide it.
The set of sequences of messages possibly sent along a channel is represented by a partially-
ordered set (poset) of ms-atoms. A (strict) partial order is represented as a pair 〈S,≺〉, where S
is a set and ≺ is an acyclic transitive binary relation on S. The meaning of the partial order is:
for ms-atoms x, y ∈ S, if x ≺ y, then the messages being represented by x are sent (and received,
since channels are FIFO) before the messages being represented by y. If the exact order in which
the messages are sent is known during the analysis, then the poset is totally-ordered, i.e., it is a
sequence. Having posets of ms-atoms allows compact representation of the set of possible sequences
of messages when orderings between some messages are uncertain. For example, consider a system
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in which a gateway forwards requests received from clients to another server. If the order in which
the gateway receives requests from different clients is undetermined, then the set of forwarded
requests would not be totally-ordered, and the gateway’s outputs would be succinctly represented
by a partially-ordered set of ms-atoms.
We could use a notation based on finite automata, rather than regular expressions, to represent
sets of possible sequences of messages transmitted on a channel. Such a representation was explored
in a state-based framework called queue-content decision diagrams (QDDs) [BG99]. However, to be
as expressive as our posets of ms-atoms, the automata would have to be augmented with an analogue
of symbolic multiplicities. Automata might provide a more efficient basis for the implementation,
but using them would probably make input-output functions harder to write. This would not be an
obstacle if automated support for generating input-output functions from state-based descriptions
of components were available. Developing such support is an interesting open problem.
2.4 Input-Output Functions
Inputs to a component are represented in our framework by a history. Outputs of a component
are also represented by a history. The signature Hist of histories is Hist
∆
= Name → POSet(MSA).
When a history h is used to represent the inputs to a component y, h(x) represents the messages
from x to y. When a history h is used to represent the outputs of a component y, h(x) represents the
messages from y to x. The behavior of a component y is represented (possibly with approximations)
by an input-output function fy such that, for every history h, fy(h)(x) represents the outputs of
y to x for input history h. If we temporarily ignore failures, the signature IOF of input-output
functions is IOF
∆
= Hist → Hist .
Recall that we analyze different failure scenarios separately. To achieve this separation, we
parameterize each input-output function by the possible failures of the corresponding component.
Thus, input-output functions are elements of IOFF
∆
= Fail ⇀ IOF , where Fail is the set of all
possible failures, and one-hooked arrow ⇀ indicates partial functions. For example, Fail might
contain an element Byz corresponding to Byzantine failures. For f ∈ IOFF , domain(f) is the set
of failures that the component might suffer, and for each fail ∈ domain(f), f(fail) characterizes
the component’s behavior when failure fail occurs. By convention, Fail contains an element OK
that indicates absence of failure. A failure scenario is a function in FS
∆
= Name → Fail that maps
each component to one of its possible failures.
2.5 Message Flow Graphs
An MFG is formulated as a function: for an MFG g and components x and y, g(x, y) is the label
on the edge from x to y; thus, g(x, y) characterizes the messages from x to y. We assume a system
comprises a set of named components, with names from the set Name. The signature of MFGs is
MFG
∆
= (Name×Name) → POSet(MSA), where POSet(S) is the set of (strict) partial orders over
a set S.
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2.6 Computing MFGs
Recall that a system is a collection of named components. A system is represented by a function
nf ∈ Name → IOFF , which gives the input-output function for each component. The behavior of
a system nf in a failure scenario fs is computed using a function step nf ,fs ∈ MFG → MFG , defined
by
stepnf ,fs(g)
∆
= the MFG g′, where
g′(x, y) = let f = nf (x)(fs(x)) (∗ f is input-output function for x ∗)
and h(z) = g(z, x) (∗ h is input history of x ∗)
and h′ = f(h) (∗ h′ is output history of x ∗)
in h′(y) (∗ h′(y) represents messages from x to y ∗)
(1)
Informally, the MFG stepnf ,fs(g) represents the result of each component processing its inputs
in the possibly-incomplete executions represented by the MFG g and producing possibly-extended
outputs. An MFG representing the behavior of a system is computed by starting from the empty
MFG empty , defined by empty(x, y) = 〈∅, ∅〉, and repeatedly applying stepnf ,fs until a fixed-point is
reached. Repeated application of stepnf ,fs corresponds to continued execution of the system being
analyzed.
For a system with arbitrary input-output functions, iterative calculation of the fixed-point is
not guaranteed to terminate. The possibility of non-termination is unavoidable—asynchronous
distributed systems with unbounded channels are infinite-state and verification for them is (in
general) undecidable. One possible cause of non-termination is that the number of ms-atoms
labeling edges in the MFG being computed might grow without bound; this is possible because
channels are unbounded queues, and our framework supports but does not enforce the use of
abstractions in the representation of channel contents. Another possible cause is that the MFG
might change after each iteration without the number of ms-atoms increasing; this situation is rare
and, if monotonocity conditions are imposed to prohibit cyclic behavior [Sto97], is possible only if
AVal or SVal is infinite.
In practice, if execution of the system always terminates, then use of reasonable input-output
functions to represent the components should lead to termination of the fixed-point calculation. Our
framework is not suitable for analyzing systems with infinite behaviors: each ms-atom represents
a finite (though unbounded) number of messages, so the analysis would certainly diverge. The
framework could be extended to analyze some classes of non-terminating systems, and this is
discussed in Section 5.3.
2.7 Fault-tolerance Requirements
A fault-tolerance requirement stipulates conditions on the possible system behaviors in a specified
failure scenario. These conditions are possible behaviors in a specified failure scenario. These
conditions are expressed in our framework as a predicate on MFGs. A system nf satisfies a fault-
tolerance requirement b for failure scenario fs if the fixed-point of step nf ,fs satisfies b. Thus, to
discharge step 3 of the methodology in Section 1, for each failure scenario fs , fixed-point of step nf ,fs
is computed and checked to determine whether it satisfies the fault-tolerance requirement for fs.
7
3 Examples
This section presents two examples—fault-tolerant moving agents [Sch97] and reliable broadcast
[HT94]—and compares the computational cost of our analyses of them to that of state-space ex-
ploration optimized with partial-order methods.
The analysis of the protocol in [Sch97] for fault-tolerant moving agents shows how cryptographic
primitives and moving agents can be modeled and analyzed in our framework. The exercise actually
revealed a weakness in the first version of the protocol we discuss: that version tolerates fewer
failures than the designers expected (and required), and it was information provided by our analysis
that helped guide the development of a correct protocol.
Analysis of a reliable broadcast protocol illustrates how atomicity properties are handled in our
framework. Atomicity properties are typically of the form: “All non-faulty components do action,
or none of them do.” In other words, atomicity properties correlate the multiplicities of actions
at different sites. The reliable broadcast example demonstrates how symbolic multiplicities enable
efficient analysis of atomicity properties.
3.1 Analysis of Fault-Tolerant Moving Agent Protocol
An interesting programming paradigm for distributed systems is that of moving agents. In this
paradigm, agents move from site to site in a network. For example, an agent that starts at site
S might move to site S1 in order to access some service (e.g., a database) available there. The
agent might then determine that it must access a service located at site S2 and move there. If the
agent has gathered all of the information it requires, it might finish by moving to a final site A
and delivering the result of the computation. The trajectory of sites visited by a moving agent is
generally not known when the computation starts, since the trajectory might depend on information
obtained as the computation proceeds. In this section, we consider protocols that enable moving
agents to tolerate Byzantine failures of sites.
Replicated Two-Stage Moving Agent. To illustrate the fault-tolerance problems that arise
with moving agents, consider a moving agent that visits two replicated services. See Figure 1.
The moving agent starts at a source S, accesses service F , which is replicated at sites F1, F2, F3,
and then accesses service G, which is replicated at sites G1, G2, G3. Since G is the last service it
needs, the agent then moves to a consolidator B, which is responsible for delivering the result of the
computation to actuator A. The consolidator computes the majority of the values it receives and
sends that to the actuator; in addition, as discussed below, the consolidator uses an authentication
mechanism to test validity of received values; invalid values are excluded from the vote.
The failure-free behavior of this moving agent (without any mechanism for fault-tolerance) is
represented by the MFG in Figure 1. Constants F and G denote functions that represent the
processing done by services F and G, respectively. For example, we see from the label on the edge
from F1 to G1 in Figure 1 that the output of F1 is in D and equals F applied to F1’s input. A typical
moving agent accesses only some available services. To reflect this, the system shown in Figure 1
includes a service H, replicated at sites H1,H1,H3 and not visited by this particular agent. The
fault-tolerance requirement is:
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MA-FTR. Inputs to actuator A are unaffected by Byzantine failure of a minority of
the replicas of each service used by the moving agent and by Byzantine failure of any
number of replicas of each service not used by the moving agent.
H1
A
H2 H3
G(F(X)):D
G(F(X)):D
G(F(X)):D
B
F(X):D
F(X):D
F(X):D
G(F(X)):D
S
X
X
F2
F3
F1
X
G1
G2
G3
Figure 1: MFG for replicated two-stage moving agent.
Consider consolidator B in Figure 1. How does it decide which inputs are valid and therefore
should be tallied? One might be tempted to say that the consolidator should treat messages from
G1, G2, and G3 as valid and messages from other components as invalid. However, that would
assume a consolidator knows in advance that the last service visited by the moving agent will be
service G—an unsound assumption, since the sequence of services visited by a moving agent is
generally not known in advance.
The solution employed in the protocol we analyze is for validity of a message embodying a
moving agent to be detemined by the consolidator based on the sequence of services that are
visited. Digital signatures provide to the broker evidence of which services were visited; [MvRSS96]
describes an alternative scheme based on shared secrets. Assume digital signatures are implemented
using public-key cryptography, and assume that each component knows its own private key, the
public key of every other component, and which service is provided by each server.
Each message sent by a source or server is signed, to foil faulty components that try to spoof
(i.e., send messages that appear to be from other components). Each source or server includes in
each outgoing message a declared destination, which is the name of the next service or consolidator
to be visited by the moving agent embodied in that message. Each server x also includes in every
outgoing message the incoming message that embodied the arrival of that moving agent at x; the
consolidator uses this information when checking the validity of the message, as discussed below.
Signatures on the recursively included messages provide a chain of evidence documenting the entire
sequence of services actually visited by a moving agent that arrives at a consolidator.
A consolidator can test whether a message is valid by checking that the agent it embodies
originated at a (legitimate) source, that the consolidator itself is the declared destination of the
message, and that the sequence of declared next-destinations (obtained from the included messages)
is consistent with the chain of signatures on the included messages. (The consolidator also verifies
each of the signatures and considers the message invalid if any of those verifications fail.) In sum, a
set S of messages is valid if: (1) each message in S is valid; (2) all messages in S contain the same
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sequence of declared destinations; (3) the final signatures on messages in S are (collectively) from
a majority of the replicas of some service.
It is not difficult to describe the behavior of Byzantine faulty components and this protocol
in our framework. Byzantine faulty components can spoof and eavesdrop (i.e., obtain copies of
messages sent to other components). From the perspective of a message recipient, the possibility of
spoofing causes uncertainty about the identity of the message sender. We model this uncertainty by
using input-output functions that are independent of the names of the senders in the input history.
We model a faulty component (the eavesdropper) eavesdropping on a component x as the
eavesdropper sending a distinguished value evsdrp to x, and we stipulate that the output history of
a component that receives evsdrp allow the possibility of sending copies of all subsequent outputs
to the eavesdropper.1 Note that evsdrp messages are just modeling artifacts. A faulty server is
assumed to be capable of eavesdropping on all components except actuators; actuators communicate
only with consolidators.
To describe the protocol in our framework, we introduce some definitions. Let D ∈ AVal
describe the data carried by moving agents. Let Msg ∈ AVal describe the messages sent by the
protocol. Let Svc be a set of constants that are names of services. The processing done by a service
S ∈ Svc is represented by a constant operator S, as in Figure 1. We assume component names
can be used as constants. Let Src ⊆ Name be the set of names of (legitimate) sources. The set of
private keys is Key =
⋃
x∈Name kx, where kx ∈ Key represents component x’s unique private key
(used to sign messages).
To conveniently represent messages sent by sources, we introduce a constant msg0 with the
following interpretation: msg0(k, data , des) represents a message signed with private key k ∈ Key ,
carrying data represented by data ∈ SVal , and with destination (either a service or the name of a
broker) represented by des ∈ SVal .
To conveniently represent messages sent by servers, we introduce a constant msg with the
following interpretation: msg(k, data , des ,msg) represents a message signed with private key k ∈
Key , carrying data represented by data ∈ SVal , with destination (either a service or the name of a
broker) represented by des ∈ SVal , and with msg ∈ SVal representing a message that caused the
server that received it to send this message.
The MFG in Figure 2 shows the behavior of this protocol for the replicated two-stage moving
agent described above. The following abbreviations are used in the figure:
m0 = msg0(kS , X, F )
m1i = msg(kFi ,F(X), G,m0)
m2i,j = msg(kGj ,G(F(X)), B,m1i).
Tolerating Failure of Multiple Visited Services. The above protocol provides some fault-
tolerance but does not satisfy MA-FTR. For example, it does not tolerate simultaneous failure of
F1 and G2, because two of the consolidator’s three inputs might be corrupted by these failures. To
1For this purpose, we allow an exception to the name-independence rule in the previous paragraph.
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AH1 H2 H3
S
m0 :Msg
F2
F3
F1
m23,3 :Msg
m21,1 :Msg
m22,2 :Msg
B
G(F(X)):D
m11 :Msg
m12 :Msg
m13 :Msg
G3
G2
G1
m0 :Msg
m0 :Msg
Figure 2: MFG for replicated two-stage moving agent, with authentication.
make the moving agent protocol more robust, we modify it so that (1) each server sends its outgoing
messages to all replicas of the next service, and (2) validity tests and voting are incorporated into
each stage of the computation after the first. The validity test and voting are just as described
for consolidators.2 Thus, a server sends messages only after receiving a valid set S of messages; to
document the sequence of services visited by the moving agent, the server includes some message
from S in the outgoing messages.3 The behavior of the revised protocol is shown in the MFG in
Figure 3. Each server Gj might include any one of its three input messages in its output, so the
value in its outputs is a set of three possibilities; specifically, the value is (ms j×{Msg}) ∈ Val ,
where
msj = {m21,j ,m22,j ,m23,j}.
Detailed input-output functions for this protocol appear in [Sto97].
Analysis Results
MA-FTR requires that in each failure scenario in which a minority of the replicas of each service
used by the moving agent fail and any number of replicas of each service not used by the moving
agent fail, the input to the actuator is represented by symbolic value G(F(X)), as in the failure-free
computation. We describe below the MFGs obtained for a few representative failure scenarios.
Failure of Visited Servers Only. Consider the failure scenario in which F1 and G2 fail. Let N
be the set of servers and brokers—that is, those components to which servers can send messages;
here, N = {F1, F2, F3, G1, G2, G3,H1,H2,H3, B}. The fixed-point computed for this failure scenario
is the same MFG as in Figure 3 except outputs of the faulty components are different and other
2The only remaining differences between a server and a consolidator are: (1) a consolidator does not perform
application-specific computation, i.e., does not apply an operator to the data carried by the moving agent; (2) a
consolidator does not include authentication information in its outputs, because the channel between the consolidator
and the actuator is assumed to be secure.
3The reader who wonders whether multiple messages from S should be included in the outgoing messages is
referred to Section 3.1.
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Figure 3: Run of replicated two-stage moving agent, with authentication and with voting after each
stage. Each skewed ms-atom labels each of the three edges it crosses. Note that ms j×{Msg} =
{m21,j :Msg , m22,j :Msg , m23,j :Msg}.
components send messages to the faulty components as a result of eavesdropping. Specifically, for
x ∈ {F1, G2}, for y ∈ N \ {x}, edge 〈x, y〉 is labeled with the ms-atom
{evsdrp,Arb({kF1 , kG2}, {m0,m12,m13,m22,1,m23,1,m22,3,m23,3})}
∗.
Arb was described in Section 2.1. Also, for x ∈ {F1, G2} and y ∈ N \{F1, G2}, edge 〈y, x〉 is labeled
with all the output ms-atoms of component y in Figure 3 but with the multiplicities changed to ?.
The input to the actuator is still represented by G(F(X)), so MA-FTR is satisfied in this failure
scenario.
Failure of Unvisited Servers Only. Consider the failure scenario in which H1, H2, and H3
all fail. The fixed-point computed for this failure scenario is the same MFG as in Figure 3 except
outputs of the faulty components are different and other components send messages to the faulty
components as a result of eavesdropping. Specifically, for x ∈ {H1,H2,H3}, for y ∈ N \ {x}, edge
〈x, y〉 is labeled with the ms-atom
{evsdrp,Arb({kH1 , kH2 , kH3},
⋃
i,j∈{1,2,3}
{m0,m1i,m2i,j})}
∗.
Also, for x ∈ {H1,H2,H3} and y ∈ N \ {H1,H2,H3}, edge 〈y, x〉 is labeled with all the output
ms-atoms of component y in Figure 3 but with the multiplicities changed to ?. The input to the
actuator is represented by G(F(X)), so MA-FTR is satisfied in this failure scenario.
Failure of Visited and Unvisited Servers. Finally, consider the failure scenario in which F1,
H1, and H2 fail. The protocol violates MA-FTR in this failure scenario. The problem is revealed by
tracing the first three iterations of the fixed-point computation, which lead to the MFG in Figure
4. F1 includes m0 in signed messages with all possible declared destinations, including H, and
carrying arbitrary data. F1 sends these messages to all components in N . H1 and H2 receive these
messages and include them in signed messages carrying arbitrary data and with all possible declared
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destinations, including B. The messages from H1 and H2 might now pass the consolidator’s validity
test and cause the consolidator to send arbitrary data to the actuator, as indicated by the label on
the edge from B to A in Figure 4. Thus, in this failure scenario, actuator A gets the wrong input.
The symmetry of the MFG in Figure 4 reflects the symmetric behavior of faulty components: they
send all of their outputs to every server and consolidator. One way to fix the protocol is to have
servers include in each output message input messages from a majority of the replicas of some
service instead of—as they now do—only a single input message that transported the agent.
A
H1
H2
S F2 B
arb
arb arbarb
arb
arb
arb
m0 :Msg ( :D)?
Figure 4: MFG for replicated two-stage moving agent after three iterations of fixed-point cal-
culation, with F1, H1, and H2 faulty. Here, arb = Arb({kF1 , kH1 , kH2}, {m0})
∗. Components
F2, F3, G1, G2, G3 and H3 and edges incident on them are elided, because the flaw in the protocol
manifests itself without them. Labels that merely represent eavesdropping are also omitted, to
avoid clutter.
3.2 Reliable Broadcast Example
In a reliable broadcast, components of the system correspond to processes. Clients C1,C2, . . . ,CN
broadcast messages, and servers S1,S2, . . . ,SN deliver messages to clients. Each Ci communicates
directly only with a corresponding server Si. The correctness requirements for reliable broadcast
are:
Validity: If a client Ci broadcasts a message m and corresponding server Si is non-faulty,
then Si eventually delivers m.
Integrity: For each message m, every non-faulty server delivers m at most once and does so
only if m was previously broadcast by some client.
Agreement: If a non-faulty server delivers a message m, then all non-faulty servers eventually
deliver m.
Send-omission failures cause a server to omit to send some (possibly all) messages that it would
normally send [Had84, HT94]. The above Validity, Integrity, and Agreement requirements must
be satisfied in failure scenarios in which the network remains connected (i.e., between each pair
of non-faulty clients, there is a path in the connectivity graph containing only non-faulty servers),
even if some servers suffer send-omission failures.
A reliable broadcast protocol is given in [HT94, section 6]. It relies on the assumption that
each message broadcast is unique. This assumption is normally discharged by including the broad-
caster’s name and a sequence number (or timestamp) in each message. To model inclusion of the
13
broadcaster’s name, we use an abstract value MF (Ci) (mnemonic for “message from Ci”) to rep-
resent messages broadcast by client Ci. To model inclusion of a sequence number (or timestamp),
we assert that, for each client, variables used to represent data broadcast by the client have unique
values. In our framework, one can associate with each system component an assertion that con-
strains the values of that component’s local variables. For example, we might use variables X and
Y to represent the data in different messages broadcast by a client and assert that X 6= Y .
The protocol of [HT94, section 6] works as follows.
• Client Ci broadcasts a message m by sending m to its server Si.
• When a server receives a message, it checks whether it has received that message before. If
so, it ignores the message; if not, it relays the message to its neighboring servers and to its
client.
The MFG in Figure 5 represents the failure-free behavior of this protocol in a system with three
clients for executions where client C1 broadcasts a single message. Variable X represents the data
that is broadcast.
S3
C3 C2
S2
C1
S1
X :MF (C1)
1 X :MF (C1)
1
X :MF (C1)
1
X :MF (C1)
1
X
:M
F (C
1 ) 1
X :MF (C1)
1
X
:M
F (
C1
)
1
X
:M
F (
C1
)
1
X :MF (C1)
1
X
:M
F (C
1 ) 1
Figure 5: Failure-free behavior of reliable broadcast protocol.
Now, consider the failure scenario where S1 suffers send-omission failures. To see why symbolic
multiplicities are useful here, suppose they were not used. In this case, each of S1’s outputs has
a possibility of occurring or not occurring and hence would have (abstract) multiplicity “?”. And
this uncertainty would propagate through the MFG during the fixed-point calculation. The result
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would be an MFG like the one shown in Figure 5, except with every multiplicity other than the
one on the edge from C1 to S1 replaced with “?”. We cannot conclude from this MFG that the
Agreement requirement is satisfied, because this MFG represents executions in which S2 delivers
the message and S3 does not, and vice versa. We know (from [HT94]) that such executions are not
possible for this protocol.
We thus use symbolic multiplicities to model the protocol more accurately. Having the same
non-wildcard symbolic value in the multiplicities on edges 〈S2,C2〉 and 〈S3,C3〉 implies that S2 and
S3 deliver the message the same number of times. Since the multiplicities of those edges depend on
which messages S1 sends, the input-output functions use variables to represent the multiplicity with
which S1 sends each message. The following naming scheme is used for these variables: the value
(zero or one) of MC,ix,y indicates whether server x relays to component y the i’th message broadcast
by client C. If a server receives the same message with multiplicities X1 :?, . . . , Xk :?, then it relays
that message with multiplicity max(X1, . . . , Xk):?.
Consider the scenario in which client C1 sends a single message and server S1 is faulty. Let
Mx,y abbreviate M
C1,0
x,y . The fixed-point calculation proceeds as follows.
1. Client C1 initiates a broadcast by sending a message, represented by X :MF (C1)
1, to S1.
2. S1 would normally relay the message to its neighbors. But a faulty S1 might omit to do so.
This is represented by S1 sending X :MF (C1)
MS1,x:? to each neighbor x ∈ {C1,S2,S3}.
3. If S2 receives the message, then it relays the message to its neighbors. S3 does the same. The
resulting MFG appears in the top part of Figure 6.
4. If S2 received the message from either of its neighboring servers, then it relays the message
to its neighbors; this is reflected by the use of max in its outputs, as described above. S3 does
the same. The resulting MFG, which is the fixed-point, appears in the bottom part of Figure
6.
One can see from the final MFG that the correctness requirements for reliable broadcast are satisfied
in this failure scenario. Validity is vacuous in this scenario, because C1 is the only client that
sends a message and S1 is faulty. Integrity holds because all the ms-atoms on inedges of clients
have symbolic value X, which was broadcast by C1. Agreement holds because the same symbolic
multiplicity appears in the ms-atoms on edges 〈S2,C2〉 and 〈S3,C3〉; S1 is faulty in this scenario,
so Agreement does not constrain the multiplicity with which S1 delivers X.
If symbolic multiplicities were not used, accurate analysis of this protocol would be possible
but more expensive. It could be done by regarding omissions of different subsets of S1’s failure-free
outputs as different failures of S1. This leads to a relatively large number of failure scenarios, which
makes the analysis computationally more expensive.
3.3 Comparison to State-Space Exploration
It is instructive to compare the compactness of MFGs and the efficiency of our analysis to state-
space exploration optimized with partial-order methods. For concreteness, we consider Spin [Hol97],
which incorporates the partial-order method described in [HP94].
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Figure 6: MFGs for reliable broadcast protocol when S1 is faulty. Top: the MFG obtained after
three applications of the step function. Bottom: the fixed-point.
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Transitions of the same process are always dependent [HP94], due to control dependencies, so
Spin would explore all reachable interleavings of the inputs to each component. As mentioned
in Section 1, our framework does not directly represent inter-channel orderings, so it does not
explore such interleavings. This difference often causes the size of the state space explored by
Spin (measured by the number of states) to be larger than the size of the MFG (measured by
the number of occurrences of constants and variables in ms-atoms). This occurs for both of the
above examples. For the corrected protocol for moving agents in a system with N replicas of
each service, the explored state space would contain states corresponding to different subsets of
the O(N) messages sent to each server being in the channels and would therefore be a factor of
2N larger than the MFG. For reliable broadcast with N servers in a fully connected network, the
explored state space would be a factor of 2N−1 larger than the MFG for scenarios involving a single
broadcast. Since there are (N − 1)! interleavings of the inputs to each server, generating the state
space takes Ω((N − 1)!) time, whereas generating the MFG takes O(N 2) time.
Symbolic multiplicities further improve the efficiency of the analysis of the reliable broadcast
protocol in failure scenarios involving crash failures [LF82] or send-omission failures, because omis-
sions of different sets of messages lead (at least temporarily) to different states, while symbolic
multiplicities avoid explicit branching based on whether a message is sent or omitted. For exam-
ple, with N servers in a fully connected network, for scenarios involving a single broadcast, this
difference causes an exponential factor in the ratio of the size of the explored state space to the
size of the MFG, in addition to the exponential factor described in the previous paragraph. Using
queue-content decision diagrams (QDDs) [BG99] in the state-based approach would not provide
this benefit.
To make the comparison concrete, we implemented the reliable broadcast example of Section
3.2 in Spin. As above, we consider scenarios involving one broadcast. It turns out that the number
of explored states is smaller if each process has a single input channel, so we model the system
that way. We used the largest possible atomic blocks when writing the protocol in Spin’s input
language; this also helps reduce the number of explored states. For N = 3 with no failures, the
MFG in Figure 5 has size 30 (note that Mx,y is a single constant), while Spin stores 224 states.
For N = 4 with S1 and S2 having send-omission failures, the MFG in [Sto97, Figure 4.7], which is
similar to the one on the bottom of Figure 6, has size 100, while Spin stores 3778 states.
4 An Implementation
We implemented our analysis method in a prototype tool called CRAFT (Cornell Rapid Analyzer
for Fault Tolerance). CRAFT is implemented in CAML Light [Ler97], a dialect of Standard ML
[MTH90]. The graphical interface is implemented using CamlTk, a CAML interface to the Tk
widget library [Ous94]. CRAFT provides a collection of CAML types and functions used to express
input-output functions and compute fixed-points, plus a graphical interface to facilitate entry of
systems and inspection of analysis results. The screen-dump in Figure 7 shows an MFG similar to
the one in Figure 1.
Allowing input-output functions representing system components to be written directly in
CAML allows the full power of CAML and its libraries to be used. Users unfamiliar with CAML
can use the graphical interface to describe systems whose components are represented by input-
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Figure 7: Screen-dump of tool showing MFG similar to the one in Figure 1. CRAFT has an option,
used here, to elide abstract values in the Val part of ms-atoms.
output functions selected from libraries, specify failure scenarios, compute MFGs for the specified
systems in the specified failure scenarios, and inspect the resulting MFGs. In displays produced
by CRAFT, if the textual representation of the poset of ms-atoms labeling an edge does not fit on
the line representing that edge on the screen, then the poset is elided. But a user can click on the
edge to pop up a window detailing the ms-atoms on that edge.
5 Related Work and Discussion
A formal presentation of our analysis method, including a semantics and a proof of soundness,
appears in [Sto97]. The semantics relates MFGs and input-output functions to objects in a more
conventional system model (based on [Bro87, Bro90]), in which the behavior of a system of processes
is characterized by a set of executions involving concrete (not abstract) values. Specifically, the
semantics defines when an input-output function represents a process and when an MFG represents
an execution. Such a semantics provides a rigorous framework for showing independently that each
input-output function represents the corresponding process. Soundness is captured by a theorem
that says (roughly):
For all interpretations of constants, all systems of input-output functions, and all sys-
tems of processes, if each input-output function represents the corresponding process,
then for each failure scenario, if the fixed-point calculation terminates with an MFG
g, then all finite executions of the system of processes for that failure scenario are
represented by g.
Infinite executions are excluded because MFGs (as currently defined) are not suitable for repre-
senting infinite executions; this issue is discussed in Section 5.3.
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5.1 Abstraction
Our abstractions are, in some ways, similar to those proposed by Clarke, Grumberg, and Long
[CGL94] and to those proposed by Kurshan [Kur89, Kur94].
Clarke et al. [CGL94] developed a method for using abstractions to reduce the complexity of
temporal-logic model-checking. The class of abstractions they consider corresponds roughly to ab-
stract interpretation and to our abstract values. They also propose so-called symbolic abstractions,
which are convenient abbreviations for finite families of abstractions. Our symbolic values are closer
to the technique they sketch at the conclusion of their paper for dealing with infinite-state systems
than to their “symbolic abstractions”.
In Kurshan’s automata-based verification methodology, approximations are embodied in reduc-
tions between verification problems [Kur89, Kur94]. A typical reduction might collapse multiple
states of an automaton to form a single state of some reduced automaton; this is analogous to
introducing abstract values. Relationships between concrete values can be captured using (implic-
itly) parameterized families of reductions, reminiscent of Clarke, Grumberg, and Long’s “symbolic
abstractions”.
For problems involving related values (e.g., X, F(X), and G(F(X))), the family of reductions
must introduce an abstract value representing each of these values. In effect, the user must deter-
mine in advance all relevant symbolic values and introduce an abstract value for each. In contrast,
with our method, the user need only determine for each component how constants and how its local
variables are used to represent the computations performed by that component. Symbolic values
are constructed dynamically by input-output functions as part of the fixed-point calculation. Our
notion of local variables supports modular introduction of symbolic values. In Clarke et al.’s and
Kurshan’s methods, the abstract values that correspond to our symbolic values—and in particular
those that correspond to variables associated with different components—must all be introduced
together in the definition of the reduction (or the “abstraction”, in the terminology of [CGL94]).
In contrast, our framework often allows a user to introduce an input-output function representing
a process (in other words, the input-output function is a reduced version of the process or an ab-
straction of the process) independently of the other processes and input-output functions, though
sometimes information provided by an invariant constraining the values of non-local variables is
needed.
An attractive feature of Clarke et al.’s work and Kurshan’s work is that abstractions (or reduc-
tions) are specified as homomorphisms and applied to programs (or automata) automatically. Our
framework does not currently provide such a convenient method for specifying abstractions; this is
a direction for future work.
5.2 Inter-channel orderings
Because MFGs do not describe inter-channel orderings, our analysis suffers (in effect) from the
merge anomaly [Kel78, Bro88]. Specifically, an input-output function representing a non-strict
process cannot (in general) represent the process’s behavior exactly; generally, the input-output
function must be a conservative approximation. One way to remedy this would be to augment
MFGs with a partial ordering that can express inter-channel orderings; this is reminiscent of Brock
and Ackermann’s scenarios [BA81, Bro83] and Pratt’s model of processes [Pra82].
19
5.3 Infinite Executions
Multiplicities are defined to represent subsets of the natural numbers, so they can represent un-
bounded but not infinite sequences. One approach to analyzing systems with infinite executions is
to generalize multiplicities along the lines of ω-regular-expressions. However, with this approach,
termination of the analysis for most interesting systems will require approximations too coarse for
checking whether the fault-tolerance requirement is satisfied.
Another approach is based on “factoring” of system behavior. Many fault-tolerant distributed
systems are reactive systems that (in theory) can process unbounded streams of requests. For
example, the reliable broadcast protocol described Section 3.2 can perform an arbitrary number
of broadcasts. Termination of our analysis depends on factoring the system’s behavior into sub-
computations that can be analyzed separately. Such factoring is common: it can be seen in the
analysis of the arithmetic pipeline in [CGL94] and in the analysis of the queue in [Kur94, Appendix
D]. Our analysis in Section 3.2 of the reliable broadcast protocol considers computations involving
only one broadcast, but (informally) this is sufficient, since it is easy to see that the protocol handles
each broadcast independently.
Many fault-tolerant reactive systems have statically-determined periodic schedules, so it is nat-
ural to factor (decompose) the executions into periods and analyze one period. An approach along
these lines to verification of aircraft control systems is described in [DBC91, Rus93]. Although that
work uses a theorem prover, the same ideas could be used in our framework to verify whether a
control system tolerates a specified rate of failures.
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